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Okay, Circuits, Now Let’s Get in Formation: A Call to Reform the Copyright Fair Use Doctrine
April Campos
I.

Introduction

Regardless of whether an artist is already a superstar or aspiring to be, the questions
surrounding the lawfulness of sampling other artists’ creations are equally vast and complex.1
Artists we listen to every day are too often embroiled in lawsuits regarding music sampling. One
such artist, Beyoncé Knowles-Carter, is currently involved in a lawsuit with the estate of Anthony
Barre.2 The estate accuses Beyoncé of sampling audio3 from two YouTube videos created and
posted by the late New Orleans rapper and comedian, Messy Mya,4 without the consent of his
estate.5 Beyoncé alleges the samples of Messy Mya’s clips constitute fair use and the dispute is
currently pending before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
These disputes, and countless others like them6 illustrate a problem with copyright law and



J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., University of North Carolina at Wilmington.
The legality of music sampling has, for some time, depended on what jurisdiction the sampling took place in, and
has been guided by inconsistently applied doctrines of fair use, de minimis, and copyright infringement. Ryan
Lloyd, Unauthorized Digital Sampling in the Changing Music Landscape, 22 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 143, 155–62 (2014).
For purposes of this Comment, music sampling will be analyzed in the context of the fair use doctrine.
2
Anthony Barre was an American rapper and YouTube personality better known by his stage name, “Messy Mya.”
Peter A. Berry, Beyonce’s Use of Rapper Messy Mya’s Voice in Her Song “Formation” is Justified, Lawyers Say,
XXLMAG (Sept. 22, 2017), http://www.xxlmag.com/news/2017/09/beyonce-messy-mya-formation-justifiedlawsuit/.
3
Music sampling is the use of small portions of existing sound records to create new audio. Bruce J. McGiverin,
Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity: Protecting Against the Electronic Appropriation of Sounds, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1723, 1724 (1987).
4
See supra note 2.
5
See infra Part III.C.
6
An early example of music sampling was the Sugarhill Gang’s “Rapper’s Delight,” which sampled “Good Times”
by the
band
Chic.
Steven Daly,
Hip-Hop
Happens,
VANITY FAIR,
(Nov.
2005),
https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2005/11/hiphop200511. Nile Rodgers and Bernard Edwards, who wrote “Good
Times,” threatened to sue the Sugarhill Gang, and the parties eventually reached a settlement whereby Rodgers and
Edwards were credited as co-writers. Id. Shawn Corey Carter, husband of Beyonce Knowles-Carter and a wellknown rapper professionally known as Jay-Z, has been sued numerous times over unauthorized music sampling. See,
e.g., C. Vernon Coleman II, Beyonce and Jay Z Win “Drunk in Love” Sampling Lawsuit, XXLMAG (Dec. 19, 2015),
http://www.xxlmag.com/news/2015/12/beyonce-and-jay-z-win-drunk-in-love-sampling-lawsuit/; Daniel Nussbaum,
Music Lawsuit Frenzy: Jay-Z Latest to Settle Copyright Claim, Awards 50% Royalties to Swiss Musician, BREITBART
(Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/big-hollywood/2015/03/13/music-lawsuit-frenzy-jay-z-latest-to-settlecopyright-claim-awards-50-royalties-to-swiss-musician/; Barbara Ross, Jay Z, Kanye West Stole ‘Made in America’
Song: Law Suit, DAILYNEWS (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/jay-z-kanye-weststole-made-america-song-lawsuit-article-1.1928591; Andrew Flanagan, Jay Z Sued By Litigious Label TufAmerica
1

2

specifically, the fair use doctrine7 today. Inconsistent applications of the fair use doctrine have
wide-ranging implications: artists are stifled by legal complexities and courts lack clear directives
from either the Supreme Court or the legislature. Coupled with the boom of streaming and social
media platforms, these inconsistencies have opened the door for ever-increasing amounts of
litigation in this area of the law.8 The fair use doctrine is intended to balance the interests of
copyright holders with the public interest by allowing certain limited uses that would otherwise be
considered infringement. By offering protection to a secondary user from being liable to the
copyright holder, the fair use doctrine is supposed to serve the public interest by promoting
creativity. The secondary user is often the “little guy” or the “amateur/aspiring artist” while the
copyright holder is most often known as the “celebrity,” the “record label,” or the “entertainment
conglomerate.” By allowing the “big guy” to exploit fair use at the expense of the “little guy,” the
legal framework has strayed away from the original purposes of fair use by effectively silencing
the creativity the fair use doctrine is meant to protect.
This Comment will briefly provide background on and describe developments in the fair
use doctrine that led to the current circuit split, address why the current standards of fair use are
outdated, and explain the need for legislative or Supreme Court clarification on the proper weight
to be attributed to each of the four factors of the fair use doctrine. Part II of this Comment will
briefly review the evolution of the doctrine of fair use: its origins from a judicially created

over
Infringement
on
‘Run
This
Town’,
BILLBOARDBIZ
(Nov.
11,
2013),
https://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/legal-and-management/5785840/jay-z-sued-by-litigious-labeltufamerica-over; Paul Cantor, Notorious B.I.G.., Jay-Z Plagued with Similar Music Sample Issues As Game in the
Past, MTV NEWS (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.mtv.com/news/2494916/notorious-big-jay-z-plagued-with-similarmusic-sample-issues-as-game-in-the-past/.
7
See infra Part II.
8
See Robert M. Vrana, The Remix Artist’s Catch-22: A Proposal for Compulsory Licensing for Transformative,
Sampling-Based Music, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 811, 812 (2011) (noting that the uncertain law has a “chilling effect”
on artists); Lloyd, supra note 1, at 163 (arguing that inconsistent judgments have had a “negative effect on both the
sampling artists and the rightsholders.”).
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exception recognized at common law to a codified infringement defense. Part II will also examine
the circuit split between the Second and Seventh Circuits in weighing the importance of each of
the four fair use factors. Part III of this Comment will discuss the difficulty in conforming current
standards to address copyright issues with user-generated content on social media platforms.
Finally, Part IV will discuss why there is an urgent need for clarification on the proper fair use
standard and the remedies available to tackle the situation.

II.

Copyright Law, the History of the Fair Use Doctrine, and the Circuit Split

A. The Origins of the Copyright Fair Use Doctrine
Copyright law derives its authority from Article I, Section Eight of the United States
Constitution, which provides, in relevant part: “The Congress shall have Power . . . To Promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings . . . .”9 The original and continuing purpose of the copyright is
“to stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the public.”10 A
perspective promulgated by legal scholars and jurists is that American copyright law is grounded
in utilitarianism.11 According to the utilitarian theory, copyright law gives exclusive rights to
authors for a limited amount of time as an incentive to create works for the benefit of society as a
whole.12 Without guaranteed rights in their creative production, authors faced with the problem
of free riders would not be able to profit from their own creations.13 The Copyright Act,14 however,

9

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1129 (1990).
11
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326
(1989).
12
See Harper & Row, Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enter’s, 471 U.S. 549, 558 (1985) (“By establishing a marketable right
to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”).
13
Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearing on Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 615, 620 (2015).
14
17 U.S.C. §§ 1–8, 10–12 (2012).
10
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does require boundaries on the rights provided to authors.15 In order to balance the interests of
promoting the public welfare without diminishing the incentive to create,16 copyright law permits
limited use of copyrighted materials without having to first acquire permission from the copyright
holder by defining the use as a permissible “fair use.”17
Fair use provides for the legal, unlicensed citation or incorporation of copyrighted material
in another author’s works under a four-factor test.18 The fair use doctrine is intended to balance
the interests of copyright holders with the public interest in the wider distribution and use of
creative works by allowing certain limited uses that might otherwise be considered infringement.19
Fair use has been recognized in common law since the Statute of Anne of 1709 20 and originated
as part of a judicially created common law exception.21 In Flosom v. Marsh,22 Justice Joseph Story
set forth the factors in the fair use analysis23 and these four factors were codified by Congress
under the Copyright Act of 1976.24 The non-exclusive list of factors to be considered in the fair
use analysis, as codified by Congress, are: “(1) the nature and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;”25 “(2) the

15

Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 997 (1997).
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate effect of our copyright law is
to secure a fair return for an author’s creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good . . . the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.”).
17
17 U.S.C. §107 (2012).
18
Id.
19
Leval, supra note 10, at 1109–10.
20
See, e.g., Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch. 1740) (recognizing that “fair abridgement” does not infringe on
an author’s rights).
21
Id.
22
9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
23
“The question of piracy, often depends upon a nice balance of the comparative use made in one of the materials of
the other; the nature, extent, and value of the materials thus used; the objects of each work; and the degree to which
each writer may be fairly presumed to have resorted to the same common sources of information, or to have exercise
the same common diligence in the selection and arrangement of the materials.” Id.
24
§ 107.
25
Id. In analyzing the purpose and character of the work, courts consider the transformative nature of the work and
ask “whether the new work merely ‘supersedes the objects’ of the original creation . . . or instead adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.” See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
16
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nature of the copyrighted work;”26 “(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole;”27 “and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.”28
Section 107 of the Copyright Act specifically enumerates fair use as a limitation on the
exclusive right enjoyed by authors.29 It provides: “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of §§ 106 and
106A [granting certain rights to authors], the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”30 When Congress codified the fair
use doctrine, it did not define fair use but instead provided a non-exhaustive list of illustrative
uses—such as criticism, scholarship, and news reporting—that may qualify as fair use.31 The
Supreme Court had traditionally characterized fair use as an affirmative defense, but in Lenz v.
Universal Music Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that
fair use was not merely a defense to an infringement claim, but was an expressly authorized right,
and an exception to the exclusive rights granted to the author of a creative work by copyright law.32
The first factor (purpose and character of the use) focuses on the intended aim of the use
and courts typically favor non-commercial uses such as educational or newsreporting use, over
commercial uses.33 The first factor considers whether the use is “transformative,” focusing on

26

§ 107. Works that are more factual in nature or employ common images are less likely to receive the same amount
of protections as creative, individual works. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
27
§ 107. This factor must be analyzed in terms of the “quantitative and qualitative aspect of the portion of the
copyrighted material taken.” See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006).
28
§ 107. Although not dispositive, the final factor has been heralded by some courts as “the single most important
element of fair use.” See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (citing Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 476 (1984).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994).
32
801 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2263 (2017). “Fair use is therefore distinct from
affirmative defenses where a use infringes a copyright, but there is no liability due to a valid excuse, e.g., misuse of a
copyright.” Id.
33
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
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“whether the new work merely ‘supersedes the objects’ of the original creation . . . or instead adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message.”34 A use may be considered transformative if it is made for a sufficiently
distinct purpose or function—such as a search engine35 or a parody.36
The second factor (the nature of the work) relates to the type of copyrighted work at issue.37
This factor analyzes the connection of the original work to the goals of copyright law. 38
Unpublished works are afforded broader copyright protection and the availability of the fair use
defense is narrower.39 Creative works such as paintings or musical compositions enjoy a greater
copyright protection than is afforded to informational works, such as a newspaper article.40 The
second fair use factor weighs against the secondary user if the original copyrighted work is
unpublished and/or creative in nature.41
The third factor (the amount and substantiality of the portion used) is analyzed in terms of
the “quantitative and qualitative aspects of the portion of the copyrighted material taken.” 42 The
qualitative aspect of the third factor focuses on the “substantiality” of what has been copied. 43 A
secondary work may be considered an unfair use if it copies the “heart of the work,” even if only
a small of amount of the original was actually copied.44 The “heart” of the work refers to the main
source of the work’s economic value.45 The third factor stands for the proposition that all other

34

Id. at 579 (citing Flosom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)).
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
36
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 579. An example is the promotion of artistic expression. Id.
39
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985).
40
See, e.g., Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1993).
41
Id.
42
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006).
43
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564–66.
44
Id.
45
Id. In Harper & Row, the court held that even though the number of words copied from President Ford’s memoir
was “insubstantial,” the third factor favored the original copyright holder because the small part that was copied was
the primary subject that readers would be interested in: why President Ford pardoned Richard Nixon. Id.
35
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factors being equal, a use is more likely to be fair if it copies only a small amount from the original
work and what was copied is not the “heart” of the work.46
The final factor (market effect) considers the effect that a secondary work has on the market
for the original work.47 The fourth factor has been proclaimed as the “undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use.”48 The Supreme Court, however, limited this emphasis on the fourth
factor in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc., by stating that the fair use test should “not be simplified
with bright-line rules[,] . . . the four statutory factors [should not] be treated in isolation[, and] . . .
all [four factors] are to be explored and the results weighed together.”49 The Supreme Court held
that the market effect should be given less weight when the use is transformative.50 The Court
reasoned that if a secondary work was sufficiently transformative, there would be a lesser
likelihood that the work would replace the market for the original.51 In certain situations—for
example where the original copyright holder is an aspiring artist and the secondary user is an
established artist—the market factor should, in fact, weigh heavily in a fair use decision.
B. Transformation vs. Market Effect: The Circuit Split Regarding the Four Fair Use Factors
The circuit split discussed in this Comment focuses on the difference in methodologies
employed by the regional circuit courts with respect to the four fair use factors—particularly, the
Second Circuit’s emphasis on the degree to which an allegedly infringing work is transformative
and the more economic-focused approach employed by the Seventh Circuit. In 1984, the Supreme
Court decided Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., and acknowledged that “[t]he
doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justification, ‘the most troublesome in the whole

46

Id.
Id.
48
Id. at 566.
49
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994).
50
Id.
51
Id. at 591.
47
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law of copyright.’”52 The root of the problem with fair use is that Congress did not “provide
definitive rules when it codified the fair use doctrine in the 1976 [Copyright] Act; it simply
incorporated a list of factors ‘to be considered.’”53 This has caused problems with consistency in
the application of the fair use principles and a divided court system. In Harper & Row Publishers
v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court proclaimed the fourth factor as “undoubtedly the most
important element of fair use.”54 This proclamation installed the inquiry into market harm as the
predominant issue in any fair use analysis and essentially made it highly unlikely that any use that
was commercial in nature would qualify as fair use.55 But following the seminal article by Judge
Pierre N. Leval56 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,57 a new
strain of fair use jurisprudence emerged in the early 1990s. Judge Leval’s article was published
following a period of inconsistent decisions among the courts and a period of reversals that had a
significant impact on fair use jurisprudence in the 1980s.58 Judge Leval’s article maintains that
copyright jurisprudence serves a utilitarian purpose59 and suggests that the judiciary should look
to the main purpose of fair use, which is to ensure that copyright protections do not become so
expansive as to throttle innovation.60 In his article, Judge Leval argued that the key determination
in a fair use analysis must be whether, and to what extent, the alleged infringing use is

52

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984) (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn,
Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)); see also Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626
F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978).
53
Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 476.
54
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)
55
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 722 (2011).
56
See Leval, supra note 10, at 1111.
57
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
58
See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp of Am., 480 F.Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev’d, 659 F.2d 963
(9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 557 F.
Supp. 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), modified, 723 F.2d. 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
59
See Leval, supra note 10, at 1118.
60
Id. at 1109.
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transformative.61 He went on to further explain that the use “must be productive and must employ
the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original”62 and
pronounced that if the secondary work added “value” to the original work then it encompassed the
very type of activity fair use was meant to protect.63 Judge Leval essentially asserts that the soul
of the fair use analysis is the first factor.64
In Campbell, the Supreme Court relaxed the traditional fair use standard by adopting much
of the philosophy in Judge Leval’s article, in particular his definition of the first factor of the fair
use analysis.65 Campbell addressed a parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman” by the rap
group 2 Live Crew.66 The Supreme Court held that the inquiry for the first factor of the fair use
analysis turns on whether, and to what extent, the alleged infringing use is transformative.67 The
Supreme Court further explained that “the more transformative the new work, the less significant
the other factors will be, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”68 It is
important to note that, in Campbell, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that the fair use
factors are analyzed under fact-sensitive inquiries and should be considered together without any
bright line rules.69 Following Campbell, the circuit courts widely adopted the transformative use
inquiry, with the Second Circuit being particularly vocal in its support of the transformative use
inquiry and instrumental in expanding fair use by using a liberal “transformation” test.70

61

Id. at 1111.
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1116.
65
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994).
66
Id. at 572.
67
Id. at 569.
68
Id. Importantly, the Supreme Court also corrected its previous statement in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc. that commercial uses are presumptively unfair. Id. at 594.
69
Id. at 577 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)) (emphasis added).
70
See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013).
62
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The Second Circuit transformation standard, as defined in Cariou v. Prince,71 set a liberal
precedent for what the Second Circuit would consider “transformative.” In Cariou, the Second
Circuit was tasked with examining whether Richard Prince’s “Canal Zone Series” sufficiently
transformed Patrick Cariou’s photographs in such a way as to constitute a fair use by Prince.72
Cariou’s original works were photographs of Rastafarians in natural scenic setting, taken for the
purpose of being featured in the book Yes Rasta.73 Prince used Cariou’s photographs featured in
this book and superimposed them with images and colored, oval-shaped blotches of color on top
of the original work.74 Prince juxtaposed the scenic images with images of musical instruments
with the goal of creating dystopian scenery through the photo series.75 Some of the works were in
fact more transformed than others, but the majority consisted of Prince using Cariou’s entire
photograph and adding a handful of elements.76 The Second Circuit held that an unauthorized
work’s transformative nature does not depend on whether it “comments” on the original work, but
rather whether it has altered the original work with a “new expression, meaning, or message.”77
This decision signified an important shift in fair use jurisprudence because the “comment upon”
requirement had previously been an important consideration for determining the nature of
unauthorized derivative works.78 Additionally, this decision was noteworthy due to the Second
Circuit’s deliberate decision to ignore the negative financial impact that Prince’s exhibit had on
Cariou’s ability to display his own works for monetary gain.79 The Second Circuit considered the

71

Id.
Id. at 698.
73
Id. at 699.
74
Id. at 701.
75
Id. at 705.
76
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 705.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. The district court case went into great detail regarding the market effect of Prince’s work on Cariou. Cariou v.
Prince, 784 F.Supp. 2d 337, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The gallery that showed Prince’s “Canal Zone Series,” ending up
selling eight of the thirty pieces of art in the “Canal Zone Series” for approximately 10 million dollars, of which Prince
72
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market factor to be unimportant because of the transformative nature of Prince’s work.80 The
Second Circuit’s decision in Cariou, served to further broaden81 the scope of the Campbell
decision, not only because it mitigated the importance of the fourth statutory factor of fair use, but
also because it lowered the threshold for transformation by not requiring the unauthorized work to
comment on the original work.82
In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, the Seventh Circuit criticized the Second Circuit’s emphasis
on transformativeness in the Cariou v. Prince decision.83 Rejecting the transformative use
paradigm, the Seventh Circuit suggested that the fourth factor was the most important of the four
statutory fair use factors.84 In Kienitz, the Seventh Circuit was tasked with determining whether
fair use existed where a copyrighted photograph of the mayor of a town in Wisconsin was turned
lime green, used to make t-shirts and tank tops emblazoned with the words “Sorry for Partying,”
and sold by Sconnie Nation on clothing for a marginal profit.85 The United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin held that three of the four fair use factors weighed in favor
of Sconnie Nation.86 The district court noted that the crux of the first inquiry turned on whether
the new work “supersedes the original work, or instead adds something new with a further purpose

received approximately 6 million dollars. Id. This is particularly relevant because, at about the same time, another
New York City art gallery had been planning to display Cariou’s photographs as featured in Yes Rasta. Id. Once the
gallery owner found out about the showing of Prince’s work at the other gallery, she cancelled Cariou’s show because
it had “been done already.” Id. Cariou planned on selling copies of his books and prints of his photographs ranging
from $3,000 to $20,000 at this gallery showing. Id.
80
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709–10.
81
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). The Second Circuit considered
whether chronological assemblage of reduced-format posters in a biography of the Grateful Dead titled Illustrated
Trip constituted fair use. Id. at 606. The Second Circuit held that each poster differed from its original expressive
purpose due to the bibliographic nature of the book, and accordingly was transformative. Id. at 609. This case
broadened Campbell by holding that even when a secondary user takes an entire work, the use can still be considered
transformative, so long as the use does not supersede the original work. Id.
82
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 705.
83
766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014).
84
Id. at 758 (emphasis added).
85
Id. at 757.
86
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1055 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (finding that the purpose and
character of the use, the amount and substantiality of the portion taken, and the effect of the use on the potential market
weighed in favor of Sconnie Nation).
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or of a different character.”87 The court also commented, with regards to the market effect factor,
that seeing Kienitz’s image next to the Sconnie Nation shirts, it was evident that the shirts “were
not a substitute for and did not reduce the demand for Kienitz’s photographic portrait . . . .”88 The
district court supported its rationale by citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell.89 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision finding that Sconnie Nation’s use of the
image constituted fair use but used a different reasoning.90 In so holding, the Seventh Circuit held
that transformative use was not a statutory factor and that it would be better to stick to the four
statutory factors set forth in section 107.91 The Seventh Circuit went on to further maintain that
the fourth factor, market effect, should be the most important when analyzing fair use.92 The
Seventh Circuit’s position following Kienitz seemingly rejects the fair use jurisprudence that
developed following Judge Leval’s article and the Supreme Court decision in Campbell. Although
the Seventh Circuit’s criticisms were levied specifically towards the Second Circuit and towards
Cariou, the language and analysis is dismissive of transformative use as a whole. The clash
highlighted by Kienitz and Cariou centers on the difference in the approaches employed by the
regional circuits regarding the four statutory fair use factors—principally the approach taken by
the Second Circuit that focuses on the degree to which a secondary work is “transformative,” and
the market-centered approach adopted by the Seventh Circuit.
III.

Current Copyright Standards Have Been Unable to Adapt and Cope with the Rapid
Rise of the Internet and Social Media

87

Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1054.
89
Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994)).
90
Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 760.
91
Id. at 758.
92
Id.
88
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In an age where emerging artists are increasingly flocking to social media platforms to
exhibit their work, it has become increasingly difficult for the law, as it currently stands, to provide
adequate protections for this subset of artists.
A. The Fundamentals of Copyright Protection
The 1976 Copyright Act defines copyrightable material as “original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”93 “Works of authorship” are further defined to
include a list of eight non-exhaustive categories.94 Courts look to whether a work is both “original
and “fixed,” rather than focusing on whether a work falls into one of the listed categories of Section
102.95 “Originality,” however, is defined nowhere in the copyright statute or in the Constitution
even though it is a defining element of copyright law.96 As a result, interpretation of the notion of
originality has developed over time.97 The threshold of creativity necessary to receive copyright
privileges is extremely low and protection applies broadly.98 Courts throughout the United States
have hesitated to unambiguously delineate the boundaries of the creativity and originality
necessary for copyright protection.99 In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., the Supreme
Court famously stated that “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
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law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits.”100 Given the subjective nature of deciding whether a work is
“creative enough,” courts have been consistent in liberally applying the standard of creativity and
originality.101 The Supreme Court, in defining “creativity,” stated that a work must be an
“independent creation” that demonstrates a “modicum of creativity.”102 Thus, the Court provided
a broad definition to respect the subjective nature of creativity.
B. Copyright in User-Generated Content Posted to Social Media Platforms
At least some social media posts would in fact meet the base requirement of originality;
the more creative the posted content, the stronger the copyright protection is likely to be.103 The
content that users post can typically be split into two classifications: user-generated content and
user-found content.104 The difference lies in the origination of the content—a user’s own creative
works are user-generated but information a user reposts or forwards on to others that was found
elsewhere is user-found content.105 User-generated content can consist of text, images, or videos
that social media users independently create and post to the Internet.106 A range of user-generated
content can be found in almost every corner of the Internet, including on blogs, Twitter, YouTube,
Facebook, Instagram, and even the Wikipedia.107 This content forms part of an emerging network
of self-expression and self-promotion that has become a hallmark foundation of online social
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culture. This content, however, also raises a bevy of issues regarding creativity, collective
authorship, ownership, and misappropriation of previously copyrighted works.108 In recent years,
social networking platforms have entrenched themselves into popular culture, bringing with them
a multitude of copyright complications.109 These platforms have changed the face of the Internet
in many ways, including bringing a broader visibility to the creative self-expression of the average
person.
Once a work has been deemed creative enough, in order to receive protection, the work
must be fixed in a tangible medium of expression.110 User-generated digital content is “fixed”
when it exists for “more than a transitory period” of time.111 The inquiry into whether a work is
fixed for more than a “transitory duration” is a fact-sensitive analysis.112 For the most part, content
posted to social media and social networking sites is not automatically erased.113 It remains stored,
detectable, and searchable. Thus, a court would likely find social media content to be fixed in
tangible form. Consequently, for authors whose works also meet the originality requirement, their
user-generated content would constitute copyrightable material.
Once creativity, originality, and fixation have been established, the creator of the work is
granted six exclusive copyright ownership rights.114 The six rights are the right to reproduce,
prepare derivative works, distribute copies, perform audiovisual works publicly, perform sound
recordings publicly, and display publicly.115 When the act of fixation occurs on a social media
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platform, however, an author may find that his or her rights have been automatically altered by the
hosting website’s Terms of Use. Social media platforms function as a means to distribute user
content to other users, therefore as a means of avoiding infringing on users’ copyrights, these
websites require users to license away the rights to the content they post.116 This is typically
accomplished when the user presses the “agree” button at the bottom of a webpage that is jampacked with dense text.117 The Terms of Use of social media giants such as Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, and Instagram each state that the user retains the rights to any user-generated content.118
Each platform, however, then requires the user to agree to an overly expansive non-exclusive
license. Facebook, for example, states that the user grants a “non-exclusive, transferable, sublicensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any [intellectual property] content that you post
on or in connection with Facebook.”119 YouTube and Twitter take it even further and state that
the license grants the company specific rights.120 YouTube’s license, for example, permits it to
“reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and perform” user content.121 This
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language closely parallels the statutory grant of rights122 and grants licenses to YouTube of all six
of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights through the Copyright Act as well as the right to sublicense all six rights.123

These licenses are non-exclusive, and therefore do not transfer

ownership,124 however, the licenses are so comprehensive that they allow these websites to do
virtually everything with user-generated content, which should make courts question what, if any,
rights do these users have in the face of such allowances.
C. Is Fair Use Actually Fair? A Fair Use Analysis for Estate of Barre v. Carter et al.
The Second Circuit’s holdings reflect the status quo on the application of the fair use
doctrine in modern copyright law.125 The Second Circuit’s stance presently suggests a liberal
standard for analyzing whether an alleged use is sufficiently transformed for its use to be
considered fair. Under current fair use jurisprudence, assuming the following two threshold issues
have been satisfied: that (1) the work is original, fixed, and constitutes expression rather than ideas
and (2) a defendant violated an exclusive right, a court will examine the four statutory factors of
fair use.126 In analyzing the first factor, the purpose and content of the work, courts have held that
when the original work is sufficiently “transformed,” its use will generally be fair.127 The second
factor of the fair use analysis examines the connection of the original work to copyright’s goals,
such as the promotion of artistic expression.128

The third factor analyzes the amount and
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substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole129 and finally, for
the fourth factor, the courts must look to the market effect of the alleged infringer’s use.130
When the Second Circuit’s expansive fair use standards are applied to content posted on
social media, the results are inadequate copyright protections to the owners of this content. In the
lawsuit between the estate of Anthony Barre and defendants Beyoncé Knowles-Carter,131 Khalif
Brown,132 Michael Len Williams II,133 Sony Music Entertainment, Parkwood Entertainment and
others involved with song “Formation,” the estate134 alleges that the defendants misappropriated
and infringed on the estate’s rights under copyright law by featuring the voice of Anthony Barre,
better known as Messy Mya, saying three phrases135 from his works in the single “Formation,”
released on February 6, 2016.136 The estate asserts it owns a protectable copyright interest in two
YouTube videos created by Messy Mya: (1) “Booking the Hoes from New Wildlings;” and (2) “A
27 Piece Huh?”137 According to the estate, Messy Mya was a well-known performance comedian
and music artist who published over one hundred videos of his performances, garnering over two
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million views on his YouTube channel.138 Messy Mya’s voice, as used in the single “Formation,”
also appeared on the album “Lemonade” and during the “Formation World Tour.”139 According
to the estate, no license or compensation was ever obtained to copy any portion of Messy Mya’s
works.140 In response, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the use of the sampling
constituted a protected fair use.141 The judge presiding over the case, however, declined to dismiss
and the case is presently set to move forward and towards a fair use analysis.142
In the case of the estate of Messy Mya, it would likely be easy to establish that the estate
holds a valid copyright in Messy Mya’s YouTube videos.143 Proceeding to the fair use analysis,
the defendants were quick to assert that their use of audio from Barre’s videos constituted “raw
material” in the creation of a music video about “black Southern resilience that featured depictions
of the history and culture of New Orleans.”144 They also assert that the YouTube videos comprised
only a small component of the Formation music video and the Formation World Tour live
performances145 and that the small portion of the YouTube clips was utilized for an entirely
different purpose than the originals.146 The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, is a
factor favoring the estate. This factor asks whether the work is a creative work, which receives
more protection, or if it more informational and functional in nature, which would afford it less
protection.147 The third factor, amount and substantiality of the portion used,148 stands to favor the
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defendants due to the significantly small amount of audio that was sampled from Messy Mya’s
YouTube videos. The Formation music video used only four seconds of a five minute and fourteen
second clip and six seconds of a one minute and fifty-three second clip, while the Formation World
Tour live performances used only the former audio clip.149 Finally, using the Second Circuit’s
interpretation of the fourth factor, the focus would be on whether the secondary use “usurps the
market of the original work.”150 As discussed earlier, in Cariou, the Second Circuit held that there
was no effect on the potential market for the plaintiff’s photographs of Rastafarians as Cariou
“ha[d] not actively marketed his work or sold his work for significant sums, and nothing in the
record suggest[ed] that anyone [would] not now purchase Cariou’s work.”151 Under the Cariou
framework,152 the fourth fair use factor also stands to weigh against the estate. Using the analogous
facts of Cariou, supporters of the emphasis on “transformativeness” could make a strong argument
may be made that the defendant’s use of Messy Mya’s voice was sufficiently transformative. As
a result, an analysis of the remaining fair use factors would be moot because, under the standard
set by the Second Circuit,153 a court is likely to place less of an emphasis on remaining three factors
in the fair use test when the court deems the transformative factor satisfied.
When analyzed under the proposed fair use reforms, the defendant’s use of audio from
Messy Mya’s YouTube videos would not be considered a protectable fair use. Under the proposed
reform154 of the analysis, which adopts the Seventh Circuit’s emphasis on the market factor,155 the
fourth factor would weigh heavily in favor of the estate and against the defendants. According to
the plaintiff, Messy Mya’s estate never received any compensation for the use of his protected
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works.156 The defendant’s use of Messy Mya’s clips were highly commercialized157 and parasitic
in nature. Removing the enhanced emphasis on transformativeness would allow a court to properly
balance factors two through four of the fair use test, all of which favor the estate. Under a reformed
fair use analysis, the defendants would not be able to reap the benefits of the fair use defense and
deprive the estate of its deserved statutory damages.
IV.

Why the Lines of “Fair Use” Need to Be Redrawn

A. The Duty to Reform Fair Use
Historically, innovation has always posed a challenge to copyright law.158 Inevitably, the
legal implications surrounding new technologies are unclear at first, and potentially infringing
conduct becomes rampant before the judiciary or the legislature have the opportunity to address it.
An early example of this phenomena was the advent of online file sharing in the early 2000s.159
Illegal Internet file sharing was such an easy way to send and receive content that it became popular
among millions of users before copyright holders brought lawsuits in waves against individual
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users and software providers.160 As advances in technology continue to give users new ways to
produce and consume content, there is an increasingly compelling demand for the reimagining and
reinterpretation of what is copyrightable. To that end, and to help enhance the predictability of the
fair use analysis in future jurisprudence, it is imperative to have a national standard grounded in
Supreme Court precedent. Although the Supreme Court has analyzed the fair use doctrine over
the years in other contexts,161 it has not squarely addressed the standard for determining whether
an unauthorized use is fair since its 1994 decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc.162 In light
of the conflicting approaches adopted by the regional circuits regarding fair use, 163 the Supreme
Court needs to step in and reconcile the conflicting decisions.
Under current fair use jurisprudence, the market effect (the fourth factor) is not as important
as it once was.164 The fairest application of fair use standards when considering user-generated
content, however, call for a heightened focus on the market effect, with some modifications from
the current way courts analyze the factors. In applying the fair use analysis to user-generated
content, it makes the most sense, in the interests of fairness, to use a test of commercial exploitation
when considering the first and fourth factors. In other words, is the purpose of the secondary use
simply sharing, free-riding, or is it parasitic? In determining this, courts should consider whether
the appropriation is from professional to amateur, peer to peer, or amateur to professional. In cases
where the defendant is a professional and the plaintiff an amateur, there must be a higher standard
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of what constitutes fair use. Otherwise, young artists and creators of original content posted to
social media can have their work illegally sampled for the gain of the professional artist without
just compensation. In this analysis, a court’s inquiry would consider the commercialization of the
secondary work: distinguishing between the value gained by the secondary user and the value lost
by the copyright holder. Use of this test would prevent a professional from exploiting copyright
law in a manner that extinguishes the rights of creators of user-generated content, a result that the
current system seems to sanction.
The legislative history of the fair use defense demonstrates that fair use is meant to be a
flexible analysis because it was Congress’ intent that there be “no disposition to freeze the doctrine
in the statute.”165

Congressional records underscore that “beyond the very broad statutory

explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to
adopt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”166 One of the implications of
the Second Circuit’s decision in Cariou v. Prince has been that the transformativeness inquiry has
bled into the other three statutory factors.167 For example, for the fourth statutory factor of section
107, the Second Circuit held that that the correct inquiry is whether the new work completely
usurps the market for the original, and that the more transformative the new work, the less likely
it will be that it does so.168 The concept of transformation has crucial ramifications for content
posted on social media, as digital works are incredibly easy to manipulate and appropriate.169
Given the Supreme Court’s denial of the petition for certiorari in Kienitz,170 there is an everpressing need to resolve the ongoing conflict in determining how to weigh the first factor
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emphasizing transformative use against the fourth factor focusing on market effects. In theory,
these two factors should be two sides of the same coin because a highly transformative use should
not cause market harm.171 Emphasizing different factors, however, can potentially cause the same
facts to yield inconsistent results.
B. Addressing Critiques and Potential Counterarguments
Critics of the Seventh Circuit’s emphasis on the market effect factor of the statutory fair
use factors argue that the Kienitz opinion rejects Supreme Court precedent set by Campbell v.
Acuff-Ross Music, Inc. by eschewing the first factor in favor of the fourth factor.172 This critique,
however, is unfounded because the Second Circuit’s central argument in Cariou is not grounded
in Supreme Court precedent; rather it focuses and expands upon one of the many principles
delineated by Campbell. In Campbell, the Supreme Court stated that the fair use analysis is:
not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it
recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis. The text employs the terms “including”
and “such as” in the preamble paragraph to indicate the “illustrative and not
limitative” function of the examples given which thus provide only general
guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly had
found to be fair uses. Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation,
one from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light
of the purposes of copyright.173
Neither the copyright statute, nor the Supreme Court explain which factor is most important in the
fair use analysis.174 Supporters of emphasizing the market effect factor of fair use argue that the
transformative test is overly broad,175 while critics of the market effect argue that the problem with
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the market factor is that it can be construed too broadly.176 Critics also argue that “by definition
every fair use involves the loss of some royalty revenue.”177 According to critics, if the market
factor is given serious deference, this factor would never weigh in favor of the secondary user and
classifying it as the single most important element of fair use would make the fair defense
defunct;178 however, the same can be, and has been, said of the first factor. 179 By employing a
more market-based analysis, courts would hearken back to the utilitarian nature of copyright
jurisprudence: that copyright protection is afforded to encourage and promote the creation of new
artistic works. Fair use would still have its place, but with a higher bar set in place. These circular
arguments are one of the many reasons the Supreme Court needs to step in and offer guidance on
the copyright fair use doctrine once and for all.
V.

Conclusion

In light of the significant differences in how the regional circuits approach fair use, it is
imperative that the Supreme Court intervene to decide how our judiciary should apply the statutory
factors and how the issue of “transformative” use should be evaluated to distinguish non-infringing
fair uses from unauthorized infringing works. When it does, it will almost certainly have a
profound impact in shaping the future of copyright jurisprudence, as well as steering the actions
of artists, social media users, and creators of user-generated content. Young artists of all kinds
flock to social media to publicly display their art and hopefully gain attention and fame. Usergenerated content posted to the Internet and social media platforms receive the most basic, and
oftentimes inadequate, copyright protections. Although often dismissed as amateurs, creators of
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user-generated content are indeed copyright owners who should enjoy the full benefits of exclusive
statutory rights. Historically, the rights of these users have been left out of consideration and
potential violations of their rights overlooked. Under a reformed fair use analysis, these creators
of user-generated content will stand a better chance of being afforded the protections they deserve
under statutory copyright law. As the law currently stands, the economic burden of serving the
public interest in copyrights is forced onto those that are not in the best place to shoulder it. In this
way, the burden for public good is placed on “the little guy” which in turn limits his resources,
desire, and ability to produce more additional creative works 180 which only serves to undermine
the ultimate goal of copyright law.
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